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In the effort to place the costs of massive hazardous waste remedial action squarely
on the shoulders of the polluters,' the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 ("CERCLA') 2 has become associated with
imposing an "octopus-like"3 liability scheme on potentially responsible parties
("PRPs'). As CERCLA says nothing on its face regarding a limit of liability on these
(typically) substantial response costs, PRPs have sought ways to achieve limits on
their liability through the courts in private actions.4
Liability thresholds can be set byplacing a ceiling on the amount of responsibility
each PRP assumes5 or by determining a "floor," an amount below which the
contributor is not considered a PRP. Floors in liability can be set either through
reported quantities (e.g., one pound or ten pounds)6 or can be based on risk
assessment of the costs or harms to human health and the environment. The
establishment of risk-based thresholds on CERCLA liability, in which this Note is
primarily interested, ensures that statutory responsibility imposed in private causes
* J.D. Candidate, 2001, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; M.P.A.
Candidate, 2001, Indiana University School of Public & Environmental Affairs-Bloomington;
B.S., 1997, University of Illinois-Urbana/Champaign. I would like to thank Professor John
Applegate for introducing me to this topic and for all of his suggestions. Additional thanks goes
to my student editors.
1. This is commonly known as the "polluter-pays" principle. ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET
AL, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PouicY: NATURE, LAW AND SOCiETY 804 (2d ed. 1998).
2. CERCLA §§ 101-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
3. William D. Evans, Jr., The "Cape Fear" Features of Superfund Contribution
Litigation: The Available Remedies and Extent ofLiability, 75 MICH. B.J. 1170, 1170 (1996)
(arguing that CERCLA's scheme of "strict, retroactive, and joint and several liability is...
unfair" and leads to high cleanup costs and soaring litigation expenses).
4. CERCLA provides a cause of action for not only the government, but also private
third parties to recover response costs from PRPs. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(4)(B) (1994). Claims fora limit to CERCLA liability have typically arisen as defenses
in these private actions. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d
Cir. 1992); Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
5. Courts have unequivocally refused to place a ceiling on potential CERCLA liability.
Doing so would contradict both the goals behind the statute and the joint and several liability
scheme. See infra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
6. The Second Circuit has clearly provided that "quantity 'is not a factor' when
determining CERCLA liability because had Congress wanted to distinguish liability on the
basis ofquantity, itwould have so provided." B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99 F.3d 505,517 (2d
Cir. 1996) (quoting B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1200 (2d Cir. 1992)); see
also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711,720 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The statute
on its face applies to 'any' hazardous substance, and it does not impose quantitative
requirements.').
INDL4NA LA W JOURNAL
of action is directly linked to potential harm caused by the defendant PRPs.
Several competing interests are central to the courts' decisions on whether to
impose some threshold level of liability in these private cases. The interests of PRPs
in avoiding substantial or inequitable response costs' conflict with the public's
interests in finding a solution to the environmental and health problems created by the
numerous hazardous waste sites throughout the country' and the government's
interest in encouraging private parties to initiate remedial action.' In light of these
competing interests, courts have thus far stingily allowed de minimis thresholds to be
placed on CERCLA liability but have exhibited contradiction and confusion on what
mechanisms should be used to do so.
This Note explores the feasibility of limiting CERCLA liability by asserting
threshold levels of remedial action. Part II begins with a background discussion on
the history of CERCLA and then provides an enumeration of the liability and
enforcement schemes. Part I also provides a step-by-step look at a private plaintiff's
prima facia case in a CERCLA cause of action and the elements needed under the
statute to establish liability. Part Il explores a few of these different elements through
which limits to CERCLA liability have been sought unsuccessfully and how these
mechanisms interact with the three competing interests mentioned above. Sections A
and B of this Part will focus on the "consistent with the national contingency plan"
and "causation" elements under section 107(a)(4).1 Finally, in section C, this Note
will explore and endorse the use of the court's definition ofthe term"necessary costs
7. By 1995, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") had estimated that cleaning
up the 1200 to 2000 most dangerous sites would cost approximately $13.1 to $22.1 billion,
while the General Accounting Office ("GAO") raised that figure to $32 billion. Evans, supra
note 3, at 1170-71 (citing Stacey A. Kipnis, The Conflict Between CERCLA and FIRREA:
Environmental Liability of the Resolution Trust Corporation, 39 UCLA L. REv. 439, 440
(1991)).
8. Immediatelypriorto Congress's enacting CERCLA in 1979, EPA estimated there were
between 30,000 and 50,000 hazardous waste sites across the country. H.R. REP. No. 96-1016,
at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120-21. In 1986, EPA's computerized
tracking system, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Information System ("CERCLIS"), used to track toxic waste sites eligible for governmental
CERCLA remedial action, changed this number to approximately 23,000 sites. Evans, supra
note 3, at 1170. However, in 1988, the GAO estimated that a more comprehensive catalogue
of all hazardous sites would show this number could actually increase to 425,380. Hazardous
Waste: GAO Finds 425,380 Potential Superfund Sites; Florio Hits EPA for Delays in Site
Assessments, 18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2043 (Jan. 22, 1988).
9. Some commentators have noted that the government has neither the time, resources,
nor the money to address anything but the most serious toxic waste sites, and therefore, the
future oftrue hazardous waste cleanup lies in remedial actions initiated by private parties. See,
e.g., Arnold W. Reitze, Jr. et al., Cost Recovery by Private Parties Under CERCLA: Planning
a Response Action for Maximum Recovery, 27 TuLA L.J. 365, 368-69 (1991-92); Joseph A.
Fischer, Comment, All CERCLA Plaintiffs Are Not Created Equal: Private Parties,
Settlements, and the UCA TA, 30 Hous. L. REV. 1979, 1990-93 (1994). To this end, it has been
noted that easy recovery of response costs through the courts is the key incentive for these
private responses. See Frank B. Cross, The Dimensions ofa Private Right ofAction Under
Superjund, 19 CoNN. L. REv. 193,204 (1987); Fischer, supra, at 2015.
10. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (a)(4)(B) (1994).
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of response" under section 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA to establish a threshold floor
of liability based on risk assessment and efficient remedial action in Southfund
Partners IIv. Sears, Roebuck & Co." This Note considers this provision the future
vehicle for imposing a threshold floor on CERCLA liability and will explain how this
mechanism balances the above-mentioned competing interests more so than any of
the other previous methods.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to determine whether a threshold may feasibly be applied to CERCLA
liability, the history of the statute and the reasons behind its enactment must first be
understood. Similarly, a discussion of the statute's liability scheme will provide an
understanding of the mechanisms used to impose attempted thresholds.
A. History of CERCLA
During the 1970s, events such as the first annual Earth Day celebration" and the
increasing popularity of Rachel Carson's definitive work, Silent Spring,3 were
bringing environmental concerns to the forefront of public awareness. Amidst this
framework, the impetus to enact CERCLA was created as the media drew the public's
attention to national hazardous waste disposal disasters, such as New York's Love
Canal, "'4 and subsequently to the problem of persistent toxic waste."
The lame-duck session of the Ninety-sixth Congress passed the final legislation as
a final compromise between three then-existing bills.'6 As such, CERCLA has often
been cited as a law not only with an aggressive initiative, but also fraught with
11. 57 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
12. The first Earth Day celebration was held in 1970.
13. RACHELCARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
14. Love Canal is located in Niagra Falls, New York. See Brian Patrick Murphy,
CERCLA 's Timing of Review Provision: A Statutory Solution to the Problem of Irreparable
Harm to Health and the Environment, 11 FoRDHAMENVTL L.J. 587, 592 (2000). The original
canal was built in the late nineteenth century but never completed. Id. Between the 1930s and
1950s, the site was used as a chemical waste dump, but in 1953, Hooker Chemical Company
sold the land to the city for one dollar (rather than face confiscation through eminent domain).
Id. The city and private developers built an elementary school and housing on the site. Id. In
1976, EPA and health officials began an investigation of the area due to chemical seepage into
homes and abnormally high rates of birth defects, cancer, miscarriages, and underweight
children in the vicinity. Id. Eventually, the school was closed and the area evacuated and
deemed uninhabitable. Id. at 592-93. Vocal and widespread media coverage of the disaster led
to a national public outcry that the government do something to hold responsible industries
liable for this type of contamination. Id. at 593.
15. See Richard Roth, Long-Buried Poisons Ooze out of the Ground, WASH. POST, Aug.
5, 1978, at A2.
16. The three bills contributing to CERCLA's enactment were H.R. 7020, 96th Cong.
(1980), H.R. 85, 96th Cong. (1979), and S. 1480, 96th Cong. (1979). Frank P. Grad, A
Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL L. 1, 2 (1982).
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inconsistencies, redundancies, and vagueness. 7 The legislative history accompanying
CERCLA does not provide much interpretive insight into the statutory gaps, as the
explanations are sparse and the language fragmented and unclear."
This has left the courts with the task of filling in the statutory holes. Over the past
twenty years, they have done so with a vengeance, broadly construing the
government's authority and the liability scheme in the interests of CERCLA's
aggressively stated goals."9
CERCLA has two recognized primary goals. First, it seeks to provide a quick and
efficient method of cleaning up dangerous, abandoned, or inactive hazardous waste
sites.20 Second, CERCLA attempts to impose remedial2 liability for improper waste
disposal practices on responsible parties, rather than burdening taxpayers, when a
third party (either the government or a private entity) initiates cleanup measures.'
B. CERCLA 's Liability and Enforcement Schemes
Pursuant to these goals, the courts have read into CERCLA a strict, joint and
several liability scheme.' In other (simplified) words, any person or entity fitting the
17. Cf PLATERET AL., supra note 1, at ch. 18.
18. Evans, supra note 3, at 1171; Grad, supra note 16, at 2; Developments in the
Law-Toxic WasteLitigation, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1458, 1485 (1986); see also Cross, supra note
9, at 201 (remarking that the legislative history is a "largely fruitless" addition to the analysis
of private cost recovery because it only directly mentions this type of recovery once).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
20. See ENV'T & NATURAL RES. PoLIcy Div. OF THE CONG. RESEARCH SERV. OF THE
LIBRARY OF CONG., COMM. ON ENV'T & PUB. WORKS, 97TH CONG., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT OF
1980 (SUPERFUND), PuBLIc LAW 96-510, sec. V (Comm. Print 1983), WL A&P CERCLA
COMM. PRINT 1983 (recognizing that attention focused on the cleanup of hazardous waste
dumps was the driving force behind the law); Stephen N. Moelis, CERCLA and Lender
Liability: Why the Search for "Deep Pockets" Leads to Small Change, 12 CARDOZO L. REv.
213, 215 (1990); see also Karen L. DeMeo, Note, Is CERCLA Working? An Analysis of the
Settlement and Contribution Provisions, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 493,496-98 (1994).
21. See DeMeo, supra note 20, at 496-97. "CERCLA is not a regulatory law. Rather, its
mission is responsive, mandating cleanup action at polluted sites." Id. at 496 n. 10.
22. See Evans, supra note 3, at 1171; Moelis, supra note 20, at 215; DeMeo, supra note
20, at 496-97. But see DeMeo, supra note 20, at 496 n.7 ("Congress wants responsible parties
to pay the price of cleanup, but... also seeks to implement these cleanups quickly and
economically.... [H]owever... locating PRPs, determining liability and costs, and devising
remedial measures is expensive and time-consuming.").
23. E.g., Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985); Chem-Dyne, 572
F. Supp. at 802. In actuality, as part of the CERCLA compromise, in order to secure enough
bipartisan votes for passage, Congress deleted the provisions of the statute requiring joint and
several liability. See Evans, supra note 3, at 1171.
In reasserting this standard of liability, the Chem-Dyne court found that statements in the
legislative history led to the conclusion that Congress deleted this language in order to avoid
a single mandatory legislative standard applicable to all situations. Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp.
at 808. The court ruled that liability would either be applied jointly and severally if the harm
was indivisible, or it could be apportioned equitably if the defendants prove the harm is
[Vol. 76:769
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definition of a PRP' may be held liable for any or all of the remedial costs, without
regard to the amount of their individual contribution. In 1986, as a part of the
amendments to CERCLA, collectively known as the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 ("SARA"),a Congress validatedthe courts' construction
of liability.' This liability scheme allows EPA to seek enforcement actions against
one or a few of the parties responsible for pollution at a toxic waste site and lets the
PRPs allocate the equitable apportionment of costs amongst themselves in subsequent
private recovery or contribution claims.'
Under CERCLA, EPA has broad enforcement authority. EPA's first task was to
collect information on toxic waste sites throughout the United States and rank and
prioritize the most serious of these sites by "degree of hazard" on the National
Priorities List ("NPL").28 When a site is listed on the NPL, EPA may file a suit for
injunctive relief or issue an administrative order, pursuant to CERCLA section 106,
requiring PRPs to cleanup the targeted area. 9 EPA also has the option to finance the
remedial action through the Hazardous Response Trust Fund ("Superfund")3" and
divisible and provide the appropriate apportionment. Id. at 811.
24. The four enumerated categories ofPRPs are listed in section 107(a)(1)-(4) ofCERCLA,
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1994).
25. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) of 1986,Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 26, and 42 U.S.C.). SARA was
enacted to fulfill five general goals: (1) to correct CERCLA's shortcomings, (2) to review and
comment on decisions made by the courts and EPA, (3) to keep EPA's authority in check, (4)
to initiate studies and long-term measures, and (5) to replenish the government's trust fund
commonly referred to as the "Superfund." See WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW § 8.2 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1999).
26. H.R. REP. No. 99-253(I), at 74 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856.
The Committee fully subscribes to the reasoning of the court in the seminal case
of United States v. Chem-Dyne Corporation,... which established a uniform
federal rule allowing forjoint and several liability in appropriate CERCLA cases.
The Committee believes that this uniform federal rule on joint and several
liability is correct and should be followed. It is unnecessary and would be
undesirable for Congress to modity [sic] this uniform rule. Thus, nothing in this
bill is intended to change the application of the uniform federal rule ofjoint and
several liability enunciated by the Chem-Dyne court.
Id. (citation omitted).
27. See generally Jerome M. Organ, Superfund and the Settlement Decision: Reflections
on the Relationship Between Equity and Efficiency, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1043, 1053-54
(1994).
28. Sites placed on the NPL are determined by criteria such as the toxicity of the waste, the
amount of substances, the likelihood of exposure to people, and the actual or potential
groundwatercontamination. See DeMeo, supra note 20, at 501-02; WilliamN. Hedeman et al.,
Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspective on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,413, at 10,417 (July 1991).
29. CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a). Anypartywho willfully fails to comply with
an action under this section may be subject to government fines and punitive damages. Id. §
106(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b).
30. See id. § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1) ("[Tihe President [and consequently EPA
are] ... authorized to act, consistent with the national contingency plan, to remove or arrange
2001]
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then seek compensation from the identified PRPs for the abatement costs, pursuant
to CERCLA section 107.3"
CERCLA section 107(a)(4) (B) also allows for compensation claims byprivate third
parties seeking recovery of remedial response costs from PRPs.32 These actions can
be brought by either innocent private parties who are not connected to the pollution
of the targeted site33 or PRPs who have previously settled with EPA' or initiated a
response themselves to recover part of the remedial expenses from other responsible
parties who are liable for damage to the site.35
As it is impossible for the government to address all of the key sites,36 this vehicle
for private initiation and recovery of remediation activities is consistent with the
government's goal to use CERCLA as an efficient, cost-effective solution to our
nation's toxic waste problem.37 To this end, the courts have unequivocally held that
initial federal government involvement is not a necessary requirement to allow
for the removal of.. . such hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant ...
31. Id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
32. Id. § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (holding anyone who falls into one of
the four enumerated categories and causes the incurrence of response costs through a release,
or threatened release, liable for "any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other
person consistent with the national contingency plan").
33. Such an example are owners of property adjacent to a hazardous waste site who
discover toxic substances have leaked from the site onto their property. E.g., Licciardi v.
Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 111 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 1957).
34. For a more detailed discussion on the ins and outs of EPA's settlements with CERCLA
PRPs, see DeMeo, supra note 20, at 506-26. See also Fischer, supra note 9, at 1979.
35. See, e.g., General Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415,
1418 (8th Cir. 1990). For example, a present owner who is forced to take remedial action
through an injunction may sue a previous owner to recover the equitable apportionment of
costs that the party is responsible for.
In actuality, this is an oversimplification of CERCLA's contribution scheme. Prior to the
enactment of SARA in 1986, courts read an allowance for contribution recovery claims into
section 107. Walls v. Waste Res. Corp., 761 F.2d 311, 318 (6th Cir. 1985) ("District court
decisions have been virtually unanimous in holding that section [107](a)(4)(B) creates a private
right of action against ... responsible parties for the recovery of 'necessary costs of response
...."' (quoting CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 107(a)(4)(B))). SARA codified this
cause of action in section 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0. The courts have been unclear how
contribution claims between PRPs arise-whether they fall solely under the jurisdiction of
section 113(f or some combination ofsection 107(a) and section 113(f). See, e.g., KeyTronic
Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816 (1994) (observing that "the statute now expressly
authorizes a cause of action for contribution in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and
somewhat overlapping remedy in § 10T). For a discussion on how private contribution costs
are allocated between the two sections, see Evans, supra note 3, 1172-74. This distinction is
important due to the different prima facia elements and varying statutes of limitations arising
under each section. Since this issue is complex enough to have inspired a few legal analyses,
this Note will deal exclusively with private causes of action under section 107. However, it is
important to note how the different policy considerations underlying the two sections have
influenced courts' decisions whether to allow a threshold limit of liability to be applied.
36. See supra note 9.
37. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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recovery of response costs incurred by a proactive private party.38 However, if the
government does have a hand in the remedial action, private parties cannot recover
monies spent in response without government authorization of the cleanup 9
C. Establishing a Private Party's Prima Facia Case
To date, district courts have reached a firm consensus as to what elements are
needed to establish remedial liability in private recovery actions.4 Private parties
seeking to recover response costs under section 107 must show (1) the targeted area
is a facility, (2) the defendant is one of four categories of covered persons, (3) a
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance occurred, (4) the release or
threatened release caused the plaintiff to incur response costs, and (5) the response
costs were both necessary and consistent with the NCP.4! '
The first three categories are relatively easy to satisfy, due to both statutory
construction and an abundance of early litigation in these areas.42 In the definitions
section of CERCLA, a "facility" is described as "any site or area," including
buildings, other artificial structures, or improvements, "where a hazardous substance
has been deposited, stored, [or otherwise come to be located]."'43
Likewise, PRPs must fall into one of the four, broadly construed, enumerated
38. See Wickland Oil Terminals v. ASARCO, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that "private enforcement actions under section 9607(a)" against identified responsible
persons are "a remedy independent of ... actions financed by Superfund"); see also
Interchange Office Park Ltd. v. Standard Indus., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 166, 169-70 (W.D. Tex.
1987); United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F. Supp. 391, 405 (W.D. Mo. 1985)
(finding that section 107 "'was meant to stand by itself' and ... [is] independent of any
requirements imposed under sections 111 and 112" (quoting United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 210-11 (W.D. Mo. 1985)); Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made
Simple: An Analysis of the Cases Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, andLiability Act of 1980,45 Bus. LAW. 923, 938 (1990).
39. See Fischer, supra note 9, at 1996 (noting that aprivate party's response costs mustbe
consistent with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP"), and citing courts that have concluded
that remedial actions taken after government involvement in the site should be considered
inconsistent with the NCP); see, e.g., United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460,1519 (W.D.
Okla. 1990), aff'd, 982 F.2d 1436 (10th Cir. 1992).
40. Federal district courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over actions brought under
section 107. CERCLA § 113(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(b); see also T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety
Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 700-03 (D.NJ. 1988).
41. E.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 1989); Ascon Props.,
Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Fairchild Indus.,
766 F. Supp. 405, 409 (D. Md. 1991); CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp., 759 F. Supp.
1269,1276 (W.D. Mich. 1991); PLATERETAL, supra note l, at 835; RODGERS, supra note 25,
§ 8.6, at 750.
42. See infra notes 43-56 and accompanying text.
43. CERCLA § 101(9), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (1994); see United States v. Conservation
Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 184-85 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (asserting that the definition of
"facility" is intentionally expansive). For a partial listing of which courts held what structures




categories under section 107(a).' Section 107(a) imposes liability on four categories
of PRPs: (1) the owners or operators of hazardous waste facilities,4 5 (2) persons'
who were owners or operators of hazardous waste facilities at the time of disposal,47
(3) persons who arrange for disposal or treatment of hazardous wastes," and (4)
transporters of hazardous wastes.49 "In short, the courts have broadly
construed Section 107(a) to impose liability not only on those parties closely
connected to the hazardous substance, but on nearly everyone even remotely
involved, regardless of whether they were physically or morally responsible for the
environmental harm' 50
Further, the courts have also construed the meaning of the third element in the
prima facie case broadly.5 A "release" occurs whenever a toxic substance is found
at a facility,' and a "threatened release" occurs if substances are stored in an unsafe
44. For a more detailed discussion of courts' fact-based, case-by-case decisions on who
constitutes a PRP, see RODGERS, supra note 25, § 8.7.
45. CERCLA § 107(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). Courts have held that this category
includes current owners without any connection to the hazardous substance. See, e.g., Artesian
Water Co. v. New Castle County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1280-81 (D. Del. 1987), af'd, 851 F.2d
643 (3d Cir. 1988). However, after the SARA amendments, courts have found an exception to
this in the narrow innocent-landowner defense under section 107(b)(3). E.g., Westwood
Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 767 F. Supp. 456,457-59 (W.D.N.Y. 1991),
aff'd, 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
46. A "person" is defined to include individuals, corporations, firms, associations,
partnerships, consortiums, joint ventures, and commercial entities. CERCLA § 101(21), 42
U.S.C. § 9601(21).
47. Id. § 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2); see, e.g., United States v. Mexico Feed & Seed
Co., 764 F. Supp. 565,571 (E.D. Mo. 1991), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds,
980 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1992).
48. CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). Courts have held that liability as an
"arranger" under section 107(a)(3) requires proof (1) that the arranger disposed of toxic waste
(2) at a targeted facility, which contains at the time of discovery the kind of toxic waste the
arranger disposed, and that (3) the release or threatened release of that or any toxic waste (4)
triggers the incurrence of response costs. Violet v. Picillo, 648 F. Supp. 1283, 1289 (D.R.I.
1986), overruled on other grounds sub noma. United States v. Davis, 794 F. Supp. 67 (D.R.I.
1992). Notice that personal ownership or actual physical possession of the toxic waste or the
facility does not determine "arranger" liability. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. &
Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1986).
49. CERCLA § I07(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4). However, this category only holds
transporters liable if they choose the disposal or treatment sites. E.g., United States v. W.
Processing Co., 756 F. Supp. 1416, 1419-20 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
50. Fischer, supra note 9, at 2003-04 (discussing the various entities liable as potential
defendants under section 107(a)). In fact, Fischer asserts that it is this broad range of liability,
as well as the retroactive application of liability, that is the prime example of congressional
intent to remedy toxic waste sites regardless of concerns of fairness. Id. at 2004.
5 1. See RODGERS, supra note 25, § 8.6, at 750-58 (discussing in detail both provisions of
the third element).
52. CERCLA § 101(22), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (defining a "release" as "any spilling,
leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching,
dumping, or disposing into the environment"); see Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d
664, 670 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting that based on this definition, all the plaintiff essentially needs
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manner.' "Nearly everything is a hazardous substance under CERCLA.... [E]ven
a single copper penny... can result in CERCLA liability."' Correspondingly, courts
have unequivocally held that threshold amounts or concentrations of substances are
of no relevance when listing a substance as a hazardous material under CERCLA.55
Accordingly, it is within the proof of the two remaining elements where CERCLA
private-party defendants have attempted to achieve some threshold limit on their
liability. The rest of this Note examines cases interpreting and responding to claims
brought under the requirements that the response costs are consistent with the NCP,
have been incurred in response to a release or threatened release, and are "necessary"
under section 107(a)(4)(B).
IH. THE SEARCH FOR LImITED LABrY
The requirement that private response costs be consistent with the NCP 6 has been
dealt with rather extensively through early CERCLA litigation. Therefore, the
discussion on this element will be brief, and this Part will focus on the more
controversial (and interesting) disputes over whether a threshold level of liability can
be implied through either the "causation of incurred responses" requirement or the
definition of the term "necessary."'
A. What Response Costs Are Consistent with
the National Contingency Plan?
The NCP is a body of regulations promulgated by EPA to govern the cleanup of
CERCLA toxic waste sites.58 A private party has proven the consistency of their
response when "the action,... evaluated as a whole, is in substantial compliance with
the applicable requirements ... and results in a CERCLA-quality cleanup."59 The
to show is the presence of hazardous substances at the facility).
53. See, e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497 (6th Cir. 1989); New York
v. Shore RealtyCorp., 759 F.2d 1032,1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (findinghazardous substance stored
in corroding drums counted as a threatened release, especially as the defendant lacked training
in the handling and storage of toxic materials).
54. Fischer, supra note 9, at 1999-2000 & nn. 109 & 111 (listing all of the various
environmental statutes from which CERCLA draws its definition of "hazardous substance"
under section 101(14), and citing United States v. Wade, 557 F. Supp. 1326, 1340 (E.D. Pa.
1983)). This is Fischer's over-the-top way of emphasizing the point that CERCLA's definition
of "hazardous substance" has almost no limits within the realm of environmental law.
EPA also has the power under section 102(a) to designate as hazardous any substances that
maypresent substantial danger to the public health, welfare, or the environment when released.
See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (2000).
55. E.g., Licciardi v. Murphy Oil U.S.A., Inc., 111 F.3d 396,398 (5th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252,260 (3d Cir. 1992); Amoco, 889 F.2d at 669.
56. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B).
57. Id. § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
58. 40 C.F.R. § 300; see also Southfund Partners III v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 57 F. Supp.
2d 1369, 1380 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
59. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i). An action will not be inconsistent with the NCP due to
"immaterial or insubstantial deviations" from these requirements. Id. § 300.700(c)(4).
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applicable requirements mentioned differ depending on whether the response action
is construed as "removal ' or "remedial."6'
Remedial actions (those that are most likely to be litigated in a private recovery
action) are subject to four primary requirements detailed through extensive
regulation.62 These requirements are listed as follows:63 (1) identification of
applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements ("ARARs");' (2) evaluation of
the remedial site (consisting of two steps, a remedial preliminary assessment ("PA")
and a remedial site inspection ("sr'));65 (3) remedial design ("RD");' and (4)
remedial action ("RA"), operation, and maintenance of the selected remedy.' In
addition, private remedial actions must achieve "CERCLA-quality" standards.6
These requirements are so extensively regulated that it is difficult to construe this
element to imply a threshold limit of liability. Since private PRPs bear the burden of
proving consistency (rather than proving remediation was not inconsistent) with such
a well-defined set of requirements, there is little room for interpreting a limitation of
liability in this element of the statute.
B. Does a Causation Requirement Exist Under Section 107(a)(4)?
In contrast, the fourth element for a private plaintiff's prima facia case, establishing
that the release or threatened release caused the plaintiffto incur the response costs,"
has notbeen analyzed to exclude potential court interpreted liability limitations. Since
the decision handed down in Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc.,7" this statutory provision
has been key to suggesting a threshold for liability. Courts have struggled over
whether such a threshold is implied. The significant difficulty underlying the
assignment of a threshold through this section rests in the various contexts in which
a causation requirement could be interpreted through section 107(a).7'
60. Actions taken when an immediate threat demands rapid action. Southfund, 57 F. Supp.
2d at 1380 n.7.
61. That is, actions that are, in comparison, more substantive, complex, and provide a more
permanent cure. Id.
62. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.400, .430, .435.
63. The following list is as summarized by the court in Public Service Co. v. GatesRubber
Co., 22 F. Supp. 2d 1180, 1190 (D. Colo. 1997). For a more exhaustive discussion on private
response costs consistent with the NCP, see RODGERS, supra note 25, §§ 8.3-.5; William B.
Johnson, Annotation, Application of Requirement in § 107(a) of Comprehensive
EnvironmentalResponse, Compensation, and LiabilityAct (42 USCS§ 9607(a)) That Private
Cost-Recovery Actions Be Consistent with National Contingency Plan, 107 A.L.R. FED. 562
(1992).
64. 40 C.F.R. § 300.400(g).
65. Id. § 300.430.
66. Id. § 300.435.
67. Id.
68. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg.
8666, 8793 (Mar. 8, 1990).
69. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994).
70. 889 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1989).
71. See id. at 670 & n.8 (distinguishing the question of whether a release caused the
incurrence ofresponse costs fromthe issues ofestablishing a causal linkbetween costs incurred
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Some courts have discussed the issue of causation in terms of whether a
responsible party created the hazardous waste site by contributing a threshold amount
of hazardous material and therefore "caused" the response (and cost) with a specific
hazardous substance.7 2 These courts relate the idea of causation of CERCLA
remediation costs to a quantifiable amount or type of hazardous pollution. This
interpretation has been deemed unallowable under CERCLA.7"
Other courts discuss causation in terms of whether costs incurred were directly
related to protecting human health and the environment from hazardous materials.74
In other words, the cleanup costs are not associated with any particular amount of
hazardous substance, but rather with the risk posed by the contamination at the site.
This interpretation is the one initially articulated by the court in Amocoe5 and is more
suitable for upholding the ideals behind the statute while, at the same time,
establishing a reasonable threshold on private liability. The Amoco court reasoned
that to construe CERCLA liability without relating it to the threat caused by the
release would exceed the statutory purpose by imposing liability on parties that have
not harmed the public or the environment. 6
If privately initiated response costs are not directly related to the threat the site
causes to health and the environment, then they should not necessarily fall under the
domain of CERCLA litigation. By focusing the court's inquiry on the relationship
between the hazard and the riskAmoco's interpretation balances the three competing
interests mentioned at the beginning of this Note.' The public's health and
environmental interests are directly addressed, the government's efficiency interest
is met by providing relief only for response costs that impact the good of the public,
and the PRPs' fears of inequitable liability are allayed because, if there is no risk,
they are not responsible for response costs.
However, due to the confusion over the various "causation contexts," as mentioned
above, Amoco's interpretation of a threshold of liability into the "caused response
costs to be incurred" 8 provision has been lost. For example, both the First and Fifth
Circuits have cited Amoco in disagreeing with their respective district courts'
and an individual PRP, and holding PRPs strictly liable for releases without regard to
causation).
72. See, e.g., Acushnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 988 (D. Mass. 1996) (refuting
the contention made in New York v. ShoreRealty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d Cir. 1985),
that including a causation requirement in section 107(a) renders the three affirmative defenses
found in section 107(b) superfluous), aff'd on different grounds sub nom. Acushnet Co. v.
Mohasco Corp., 191 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 1999).
73. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 259 (3d Cir. 1992)
(holding that CERCLA imposes no threshold concentration or amount requirement); Dedham
Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146,1155 (1 st Cir. 1989) (finding that
in multiple sources of contamination, a plaintiff does not have to show a specific causal link
between costs incurred and a specific generator's wastes).
74. See, e.g., Amoco, 889 F.2d at 670-71.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
78. CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4) (1994).
20011
INDIANA LAWJOURNAL
reasoning, finding an Amoco-type threshold of liability under section 107(a)(4).79
Added to this confusion is the refusal of CERCLA proponents to allow a causation
element to be interpreted into their strict, joint and several liability scheme. As
previously mentioned, CERCLA was designed for joint and several liability
purposes.' Inherent in this liability scheme is the "polluter-pays" principle,"' one of
the cornerstones of CERCLA authority.' Due to the various types of parties that may
be either defendants or plaintiffs in private-party litigation,83 and considering that
most hazardous waste sites have multiple PRPs, comingling these ideals with a fact-
based causation element can lead to contradictory decisions based on differing policy
concerns.4
All of that confusion and quibbling over terms and definitions leads to the
conclusion that it is imperative to find a different provision that will more succinctly
express Amoco's interpretation of liability thresholds.
C. What Are "Necessary" Costs of Response?
In the early part of CERCLA's litigation history, the section 107(a)(4)(B)" 5
requirement that a private party may only recover the "necessary costs of response"
did not receive much judicial attention.' As neither the NCP nor CERCLA defines
costs that are "necessary," courts have adopted a case-by-case, fact-based method to
determine whether incurred response costs were "necessary," rather than developing
a restrictive definition of the term. 7 Courts have traditionally defined "necessary" as
"logically unavoidable" but "uncompelled by the [EPA]," 8 focusing instead on
whether incurred costs were part of an allowable recovery action. 9
79. See Acushnet Co. v. Mohasco Corp., 191 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 1999), aff'g on other
grounds Acusbnet Co. v. Coaters, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 988(D. Mass. 1996); Licciardi v. Murphy
Oil U.S.A., Inc., Ill F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'g 111 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 1997).
80. Supra note 23 and accompanying text.
81. Supra note 1.
82. Supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
83. For example, a private CERCLA plaintiff may be either an innocent third party or a
PRP, see supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text, while a defendant might be any type of
PRP, regardless of their extent of pollution in comparison with other PRPs or other fairness
concerns.
84. Compare Acushnet, 191 F.3d at 69 (noting that in a contribution type of action, a de
minimis PRP does not really cause another, larger plaintiff PRP to incur response costs), with
Licciardi, 11 F.3d at 396 (basing the court's decision on the policy concerns inherent in an
innocent third party, rather than a PRP).
85. CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (1994).
86. Reitze et al., supra note 9, at 399; Kyle E. McSlarrow et al., A Decade of Superfund
Litigation: CERCLA Case Law from 1981-1991, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,367,
10,401 (July 1991).
87. See Reitze et al., supra note 9, at 399-400; see also Brewer v. Ravan, 680 F. Supp.
1176, 1179 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (noting the difficulty arising in applying section 107(a)(4)(B),
as CERCLA does not define "necessary costs of response").
88. Allied Corp. v. Acme Solvents Reclaiming, Inc., 691 F. Supp. 1100, 1107 (N.D. Ill.
1988).
89. See supra note 86.
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As an example of the early courts' dismissals of a more useful meaning for the term
"necessary," the Eighth Circuit in General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial
Automation Systems, Inc.,' held that the term included any of the cleanup costs
mandatedby the NCP and any expenses incurred in compliance with state standards.9'
In court, Litton tried to advance the argument that General Electric's response costs
were not "necessary," but rather were incurred to enhance the value of the property.9
While later courts have ruled on this issue, determining that CERCLA plaintiffs
cannot impose their own value enhancing "fixer-upper" costs on PRPs,93 the Litton
court held that General Electric's costs were incurred merely trying to achieve state-
imposed environmental standards.' As the response costs were mandated by state
law, and subsequently by the NCP,95 General Electric was allowed to recover those
cleanup expenditures that were deemed consistent.'
Given that consistency with the NCP is already one of the previous requirements
of proving prima facia CERCLA liability, this "new" reading into the statute seems
both redundant and unnecessary. Recent case law sheds light on this seeming
redundancy and brings to life a new possibility to impose a bottom-line threshold of
CERCLA liability, using similar reasoning as the unsuccessful "causation attempf'
but being better suited to balance the competing interests central to any CERCLA
litigation.9
In Southfund Partners II v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the court held that private
litigants' response costs are only "necessary," and therefore recoverable, if the
plaintiff shows "(1) that the costs were incurred in response to a threat to human
health or the environment that existed prior to initiation of the response action and (2)
that the costs were necessary to address that threat."'0 ' Under this standard, the court
held that Southfund had not fulfilled its burden of proving that the costs incurred to
clean the groundwater 2 and soil were necessary to address threats to the public's
90. 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990).
91. Id. at 1421.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Southfund Partners III v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1378-
79 (N.D. Ga. 1999); see also, e.g., G.J. Leasing Co. v. Union Elec. Co., 854 F. Supp. 539,561
(S.D. Ill. 1994), aff'd, 54 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that owners cannot remove
contamination solely to upgrade the use of the property and then recover response costs from
someone else under CERCLA).
94. Litton, 920 F.2d at 1421.
95. See Reitze et al., supra note 9, at 399.
96. Litton, 920 F.2d at 1421.
97. See supra Part II.A (discussing the requirement that private response costs be
consistent with the NCP).
98. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
100. 57 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
101. Id. at 1378.
102. The court held that Southfund failed to show that any ofthe contaminated groundwater
flowed into any sources of drinking water, leaked into any downstream creeks, lakes, or ponds,
or subsequently adversely affected human health, animals, or plants. Id. at 1379 (citing In re
Bell Petroleum Servs., Inc., 3 F.3d 889,905 (5th Cir. 1993), and Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc.
v. Lewis Indus., Inc., No. CIV.A. 94-0752, 1996 WL 557592, at *50-*52 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1,
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health orthe environment. 3 The evidence showed the contaminated soil was covered
by asphalt, enclosed by a fence and was not even considered to be worthy of remedial
efforts by the state department of natural resources."
This requirement that response action expenditures may only be recoverable if
undertaken to protect human health and the environment has been supported by other
recent district court decisions"°s and stems from the requirements set forth in subpart
H of the NCP.'° As the Ninth Circuit points out this inquiry focuses on the nature
of the threat imposed and is factually specific.° 7 However, another court has recently
rejectedAmoco's similar "protection-based" theory of causation,' arguing that "[t]o
fashion a quantitative minimum threshold for CERCLA liability under the guise of
a non-statutory 'justification' theory is to undo the policy decision Congress has
already made."'" However, this same decision supported a limitation imposed by
CERCLA's "necessary" requirement."
This conflict exemplifies why a "necessary" limitation is imminently preferable to
a causation requirement as a bottom-line threshold of CERCLA private liability. Not
only is the theory supporting this limitation similar to the reasoning set forth behind
1996)).
103. Id. at 1379.
104. Prior to the initiation of this action, Southfund argued for and obtained removal of the
site from Georgia's Hazardous Site Inventory ("HIS") listing, based on mitigating factors such
as the ones enumerated by the court in denial of the plaintiff's claim for recovery. Id. at 1372,
1379. However, the court did not stop there, extending the definition of "necessary" to require
a violation of a state standard. Id. at 1379 ("Without any evidence [Georgia's] DNR required
the remedial efforts undertaken to ameliorate the effects of contamination, no reasonablejuror
could find the response costs to be necessary." (citing Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal
Corp., 990 F. Supp. 1188, 1193 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (finding that the plaintiffs voluntary
response costs were not necessary because the regional environmental authority would not have
ordered remedial action on its own), affd in part and rev'd in part, 227 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir.
2000), reh'g en banc granted by 240 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2001))).
105. See, e.g., Marriott Corp. v. Simkins Indus., 929 F. Supp. 396, 403 (S.D. Fla. 1996)
(finding that the plaintiff's expenditure to expand its excavation in removing industrial wastes
from the site was a necessary response to a threat to the public health and the environment).
106. 40 C.F.IL § 300.700 (2000). Inpart, theregulations contend that theresponse costswill
be deemed consistent with the NCP if they result in "CERCLA-quality cleanup." Id. §
300.700(c)(3)(i). The comment accompanying subpart H states that a "CERCLA-quality
cleanup" is one that (among other requirements) is "protective of human health and the
environment." National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed.
Reg. 8666, 8793 (Mar. 8, 1990). Courts that have read the "protective" definition into the term
"necessary" have done so pursuant to the accepted NCP standards.
107. See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 227 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2000)
(holding that the intent of the private plaintiff and the agency's action or inaction were not
wholly indicative of the threat), reh'g en banc granted by 240 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2001).
108. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
109. Johnson v. James Langley Operating Co., 226 F.3d 957, 962 (8th Cir. 2000).
110. Id. at 963-64. However, I disagree with the court's assessment that this requirement is
met if the private plaintiff had a "reasonable belief that the defendant's release ... would
contaminate his property." Id. at 964.
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the causation threshold,"' but also it avoids many of the conflicts inherent in placing
limitations on the causation requirement." Furthermore, a "necessary" threshold
under section 107(a)(4)(B) is better equipped to further andbalance both CERCLA's
primary goals"' and the three competing interests mentioned in the Introduction." 4
Once again, those three competing interests are (1) the PRPs' interests in limiting
the exorbitant response costs they often face without regard to fairness of allocations
of costs; (2) the public's concern over the hazards associated with the lingering toxic
waste sites; and (3) the government's interest in achieving an efficient and cost-
effective method of response through private remedial and recovery activities. " '
Interpreting section 107(a)(4)(B)'s "necessary" response cost requirement as a
definitive threshold to liability accomplishes all three of these stated interests. As the
single prima facie element that the courts have not construed broadly, this provision
offers protection for those PRPs whose dumping or waste management activities are
not dangerous to society's welfare." 6
Additionally, the courts' explicit recognition of a standard that calls for the
protection of human welfare and the environment" 7 addresses the public's concerns
that dangerous hazardous waste sites not be left unattended and ignored. Finally, an
efficient and cost-effective method of response actions is bound to develop through
future case law, as private plaintiffs seek to document"" and minimize the response
costs they will be called on to justify."9
For all of these reasons, this Note emphasizes and encourages future courts and
Congress to take heed of Southfund's articulated threshold ofCERCLA liability and
to extend it in furtherance of future statutory reform.
IV. CONCLUSION
During PRPs' search to limit their possible exorbitant CERCLA liability over the
past twenty years of private-party litigation, the question has been raised
whether polluting entities even deserve to have a threshold level of liability asserted.
The answer to this question has typically been answered along partisan lines,
I 11. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text; see also Carson Harbor, 227 F.3d at
1207-10.
112. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
116. This protection would alleviate the concerns expressed by Fischer that "even a single
copper penny" could trigger CERCLA liability. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
117. Protection extends even to various plant and animal inhabitants downstream from a
hazardous waste facility. Cf Southfund Partners III v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d
1369, 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1999).
118. See, e.g., Reitze et al., supra note 9, at 400-01 ("[A] private action plaintiff who fails
to document the reasons for cleanup expenditures falls short ofmeeting the 'necessary' burden.
A mere list of expenses, without any reasonable basis to demonstrate the necessity of the costs,
does not fulfill the burden.").
119. Cf Southfund, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1379-80 (placing the burden of establishing that a
response cost should be considered "necessary" squarely on the shoulders of the plaintiff).
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depending on whether one is advocating for the government, a plaintiff seeking to
recover costs, or environmental groups on one hand, or for industry, property owners,
or CERCLA defendants on the other.
Considering this question from both sides of the proverbial fence, this Note
answers: "Yes, a necessary threshold of liability should be implemented."
Considering CERCLA's broadly construed, strict liability scheme, it is desirable and
possible to require a threshold level of liability under the Southfund "necessary"
standard while still retaining CERCLA's two primary goals of quick and efficient
responses to toxic wastes, the costs of which are allocated to the responsible
polluters.
